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Abstract 
Realizing the ultimate inadequacy or irrelevance of 
logical positivism in understanding the growth of science, Kuhn 
sets about the task of giving a genuine explanation in which theory 
change comes about. One of the chief criticism-<that Kuhn and 
others have raised against logical positivism is that the empiricist 
picture of the structure of scientific theories is unrealistic, it does 
not reflect the way in which science is actually done. While in the 
work of Kuhn much historical evidences lie in the background to 
articulate his account. The model of science, which Kuhn sees, has 
been explicated in terms of his notions of Paradigm. Kuhn 
characterizes a period of time during which a particular scientific 
community shares a paradigm as a period of normal science. 
During such a period, the energies of the members of the 
community are given over in solving puzzles definebtby the 
paradigm which is itself based on some significant scientific 
achievements. Further Kuhn argues that a transition from one 
paradigm to another involves a change in meaning, which 
estabUshes the endeavor that the scientist with a new paradigm 
sees differently from the way he has seen before. 
Logical positivists hold that meaning of a scientific 
term remains invariant across a theory. On the contrary Kuhn was 
of the view that meaning of a scientific term varies through 
paradigm shift. Thus he establishes the positive and salutary virtue 
of his notion of paradigm shift. The meaning variance thesis has 
been a reaction to logical positivist's tradition, which holds that 
change, and comparison of meaning of scientific terms presented 
no problem. 
The author in this thesis has made the modest attempt to 
analyse the problem of meaning variance or conceptual change, 
which has been dominated so much in post positivistic philosophy 
of science. Because the creation of concept through which to 
comprehend and communicate about physical phenomena 
constitutes much of the scientific enterprise. Thus it has been 
explored in Chapter-II that meaning variance according to Kuhn 
occurs in the form of paradigm shift. 
It is desirable according to the topic to analyse the 
views of the few eminent post-Kuhnian thinkers such as Imre 
Lakatos, Larry Laudan, C R Kordig, Mark A Stone and John 
Watkin to see their approaches and findings. The chapter-Ill entails 
the respective position in the light of Kuhnian notion. 
Lakatos begins his reworking on Kuhnian paradigm 
into research program and argues that the rationality of science lies 
in scientific research program and maintains that the relative merits 
of research programs can be compared and assessed. His research 
program methodology is concerned with how a mature science 
develops a particular theoretical prospective on the world. He 
defines the research program in terms of problems shift, which is 
said to be progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically 
progressive, otherwise it is degenerative. Thus Lakatos established 
that a mature and rational way of doing science is to undertake a 
research program, developing a theoretically progressive problem 
shift by trying to modify theories by the addition of new 
hypothesis. 
In response to Kuhn's assault on the traditional 
philosophy of science and Lakatos' alternative view about the 
progress in science through research program, Laudan developed 
his model in the form of research tradition, which provides a 
guideline for the development of specific theory. The primary 
function of a research tradition is to establish a general ontology 
and methodology so that the rational persuitability of it may be 
determined by the rate of progress it has exhibited. Regarding 
meaning change as advocated by Kuhn, Laudan says that Kuhn's 
view leads to argue that history of science is nothing but a 
succession of a different world view and the rational change can 
never be made between such divergent schemes of the universe 
because each has its own rationale and integrity. Keeping the view 
of both positivists and post positivists regarding comparison of 
theories, Laudan holds another view and says that neither 
correspondence rule nor a theory-true observation language is 
necessary and established that we can compare theories with 
respect to internal consistency or coherence. 
Now comes the brief view of the eminent post-Kuhnian 
thinker taken in this work is C R Kordig who maintained his stand 
against the meaning variance and incommensurable position of 
Kuhn by sketching six methodologically undesirable 
consequences. Finally Kordig established an alternative account 
and suggested that comparison of different theories are possible 
which are made through appeal to shared principles and meaning at 
first and second level. 
Mark A Stone has also been discussed as a post 
Kuhnian and he objected to Kuhn's notion of paradigm shift 
(criteria for meaning change). As stated by Kuhn, the possession of 
paradigm as well as the decision to reject one paradigm and to 
accept another is a necessary condition for practicing science. 
Further the scientist never abandons one theory until a successor is 
at hand. Mark A Stone established a sharp opinion and 
exhamplifies several cases where scientist can and must reject one 
paradigm without ready successor. 
The last eminent post Kuhnian thinker who has been 
endorsed in the present work is John Watkin who confronted with 
Kuhn's account and raised his objection about the possibility of the 
emergence of a new paradigm; (criteria for meaning variance) and 
suggested that paradigm monopoly, clash between old and new 
paradigm must go. 
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Thus there is no lack of suggestions for the criteria used 
by scientists in making their choice. At last, in my analysis, I find 
Kuhn's approach of paradigm shift; a dependent criteria for 
meaning variance is more successful, more revolutionary and may 
provide enough avenues and insights to the coming philosophers of 
science in their major concern of investigations. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Philosophy of science is an emerging 
1 
area and can be traced back to Plato and 
z 
Aristotle. With the rise of science in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century, scientific 
thinking expanded on the question of how 
experiment and hypothesis could lead to knowledge. 
The most influential contribution of the new 
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science was Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum first 
published in 1620, which formulated rules for 
discovering causal laws from experimental 
observation. Through the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, controversies about 
scientific views were intermixed with 
controversies about methodology, for example 
debate between Cartesian and Newtonian about 
celestial mechanics and the appropriate role of 
hypothesis. 
In the first half of the nineteenth 
century, three major works defined the philosophy 
of science. In 1830, John Hershel published his 
preliminary discourse on natural philosophy which 
accommodated both Baconian discovery of causal 
laws from observations and the use of hypothesis 
that go beyond what is observed. William whewell's 
philosophy of the inductive science published in 
1840 contained insightful discussions of the 
importance of scientific concepts and explanatory 
theories. But in 1843 J S Mill published first of 
many editions of his system of logic which proved 
to be more in keeping with the empiricist temper 
of the time. Then in 1920 and 1930 there emerged a 
school in Europe consisting of very talented 
philosophers of science known as ''Vienna Circle" 
advocating a doctrine that come to be known as 
"Logical Positivism". It is often said that 
Positivism emerged as a response to the 
metaphysical excesses of Hegel and his neo 
Hegelian successor who sought to explain reality 
in terms of metaphysical entities, which did not 
admit of empirical specifications. 
Most of the logical positivists hold that 
scientific theories are to be understood as set of 
axioms in formal deductive systems. Theories are 
confirmed by deciding their consequences from the 
axioms and checking to see whether the predictions 
hold. This methodology is called Hypothetic 
Deductive because it emphasizes the use of 
hypothesis to make predictions. 
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Popper' (1959) was agreed with logical 
positivists on the issue of hypothetical deductive 
reasoning, however he differed on the role of 
prediction to be used to falsify theories, not to 
confirm them. The schema may be expressed in the 
following way. 
Start with hypothesis "H". 
Use logic to deduce predicted observation "O". 
If "0" is observed then "H" is confirmed (Hempel). 
If ''0"is not observed "H" is falsified (Popper) . 
The logical positivist movement had great 
influence in philosophy and science but in the 
late 1950s it came under the severe attack to some 
of its central tenets. 
Toulmin (1953) & Hanson (1958) criticized 
the hypothetical deductive account of theories and 
argued that theory and observations were much more 
intertwined then empiricist allowed. 
In 1962, the first edition of Thomas 
Kuhn^s structure of scientific revolution appeared 
and became the most influential work in the 
philosophy of science of the succeeding decades. 
Kuhn talked of paradigm, a conceptual scheme that 
governs not only how we see the world but even in 
some of his pronouncement how the world is. Kuhn, 
Feyrabend and others used historical analysis to 
show that elegant analysis of scientific theories 
that logical positivists offered bear little 
relation to scientific practice. 
Today's philosophy of science is 
characterized by variety of approaches. In 
methodology, some philosophers look more to 
history, others to logical analysis. 
I have not taken anything new but a 
general survey of logical positivism that how it 
emerged and its consequence upon the philosophy of 
science thereof. 
Revolutionary new views concerning 
science have been advanced by Feyrabend, Hanson, 
T.S. Kuhn, Toulmin and others. Each holds that 
transition from one scientific tradition to 
another force radical change in 
(a) what is observed. 
(b) In the meaning of the terms employed. 
There is a much similarity in the views 
of these thinkers. Each adopts the meaning 
variance position with regards to most scientific 
transitions. Their interpretations of science 
would seem to eventuate in relativism. It would 
become impossible as a consequence of their views 
to compare any two different scientific theories. 
Scientific transition would become complete and 
incommensurable replacement. So the new philosophy 
of science and their approaches brought out such 
features of science, which clearly conflict with 
traditional forms of logical empiricism. The 
logical empiricist tradition has tended to view 
the history of science as virtually irrelevant to 
the philosophy of science. It tended to look on 
the history of science as a chronological record 
of the slow removal of the obstacles to scientific 
progress. 
Further logical empiricists resorted in 
particular to the presumably neutral and meaning 
invariant observational language employed by 
different theories. On the other hand radical 
meaning variance theorists have rejected this 
notion, 
In short we can say that the logical 
empiricist traditions have over emphasized the 
invariance of meaning in scientific change. Actual 
science however does not proceed in this way. 
After scientific revolutions, scientists do use 
scientific terms in some new ways. One can say 
that the terms employed by successive theories 
have changed meaning to some degree. 
In accordance with the topic of my 
thesis, I would like to choose first to put the 
Kuhn's account of the dynamic of scientific growth 
followed by the problems of meaning variance and 
incommensurability. 
Kuhn describes scientific discovery as a 
sequence of normal science, crisis, revolution and 
new normal science. We can sketch the dynamics of 
scientific growth in the following way 
Scientific growth->paradigm->Normal 
science->Puzzle solving->Anamoly-> Crisis-
>Extraordinary science-> Re-volution->Normal 
science. 
In normal science, scientist 
revises theories for resolving anomalies using 
fixed paradigm and a fixed language. But from time 
to time, however, crisis occurs when scientists 
fail to cope with the anomalies observed. When 
crisis occurs, a revolution is needed in 
scientific investigations followed by a paradigm 
shift in which new language is adopted after which 
a new normal science starts. So we can say that 
Kuhnian notion of scientific growth is the 
development of new paradigm and its competition 
with the older one constitutes a scientific 
revolution. Kuhn further went to say that the 
rival paradigms are incommensurable; means 
scientists in each paradigm would not be able to 
engage in rational dialogue across the boundary. 
Scientists in different paradigm according to Kuhn 
live and work in different worlds. So the 
introduction of the new paradigm paves the way for 
the creation of concepts through which to 
comprehend, to communicate about physical 
phenomena, constitutes much of the scientific 
enterprise. Concept plays a central role in the 
construction and testing of the laws and the 
principles of a theory. The introduction of the 
new concepts and the alterations of the existing 
ones are a crucial state in most changes in 
theories. 
Thus our understanding of science 
is seriously deficient if we fail to examine the 
question of how scientific concepts emerged and 
are subsequently altered. This is especially 
notable in view of the fact that problems of 
conceptual change in science in the form of the 
"Meaning Variance" have dominated so much in post 
positivistic philosophy of science. So my endeavor 
in the present work would be to examine in 
particular the process of meaning change. If one 
throws an eye in the post positivistic philosophy 
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of science, one can find that change of meaning is 
the result of scientific revolution i.e. it takes 
place in such a way that the concepts of the new 
theory completely replaces those of the previous. 
But in the realm of the positivist's framework, 
account of meaning and meaning change in science 
erected no problem. Now I have to concentrate on 
my problems related to the topic to reach up to 
the solution of the problem, I :- :" first take up 
the Kuhnian notion of meaning change. 
The second chapter will explore how Kuhn 
differs from Logical Positivist's account of 
meaning Invariance and in what respect he 
propounded his theory of meaning variance in the 
form of paradigm shift. 
In the third chapter, the author wishes 
to analyze the notion of few eminent post Kuhnian 
thinkers such as Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, C R 
11 
Kordig, Mark A Stone, John Watkin to see how they 
established their position in comparison to 
Kuhnian Notion, 
At the stage of concluding my work, I 
argue that the Kuhn's model of Meaning Variance in 
the form of paradigm shift is highly appealing and 
it may provide a major breakthrough in scientific 
progress. 
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Chapfer-2 
CHAPTER-2 
Thomas Kuhn^ s Notion of Meaning Variance 
Logical empiricists have treated 
scientific theories as semantically interpreted 
formal system with precise rule of interpretation. 
They seldom analyze or examine the historic 
developments of actual science. This tradition has 
tendered to view the history of science virtually 
irrelevant to the philosophy of science. 
As Shapere stresses, the positivistic 
tradition within twentieth century philosophy of 
science has not only utilized the notion of a 
meaning invariant observational language in order 
to analyze the meaning and acceptability of Single 
theories. It also uses this device by which 
different theories can be said to be "in 
competition" and as a basis by which one theory can 
be chosen as better than its competitors."^ 
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This was the alleged source of reaction to 
the Meaning Variance theorists particularly Kuhn. 
He has emphasized the variance of meaning in 
scientific change and claimed that different 
theories are incommensurable in meaning. 
Kuhn views science as working from 
within a perspective or Weltanschauung which shapes 
the interest of the science, how phenomena are 
viewed, the demand it makes on theories, and the 
criteria of acceptability it insists on for 
theories. He argues the evolution of scientific 
Weltanschauungen as fundamentally discontinuous, 
which amounts to the rejection of one 
Weltanschauungen in favour of another. With this 
change some of the old theories, laws, the results 
are rejected and those, which are not rejected, are 
reinterpreted or modified when incorporated into 
the new Weltanschauungen. So Kuhn views major 
scientific advances as being revolutionary in 
nature. 
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In his most influencing work, "The 
structure of Scientific Revolution", Kuhn has as 
his basic problem; the nature of scientific change 
and he summarizes that "scientific revolutions are 
those non-cumulative developmental episodes in 
which an older paradigm is replaced in whole by an 
incompatible new one,^ where paradigms are defined 
to be "accepted examples of actual scientific 
practice which include law, theory, application and 
instrumentation together to provide models from 
which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research. 
Kuhn admits that his use of paradigm 
identifies two quiet distinct notions; exemplars 
which are concrete problem solutions accepted by 
the scientific community and disciplinary matrixes 
which are the shared elements and have as 
components, symbolic generalization, shared 
commitments to beliefs in particular model, shared 
value and shared exemplars. If scientific changes 
15 
are fundamentally revolutionary, there must be non-
revolutionary periods as well,'' and Kuhn's starting 
point is to characterize the nature of non-
revolutionary science or he calls it Normal 
science. 
The characteristics of normal science is 
that it is carried out by a scientific community 
which shares firm answers to questions like the 
following: what are the fundamental entities of 
which the universe is composed? How do these 
interact with each other and with what sense? What 
questions may be legitimately asked about such 
entities and what techniques employed in seeking 
solutions? ^ The additional characteristics of 
normal science is that members of scientific 
community share a common disciplinary matrix. 
Normal science is viewed as the routine 
verification of the dominant theory in any 
historical period. Verification and testing become 
part of a puzzle solving activity. In Kuhn words: 
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"Normal Science" means 
research firmly based upon one or 
more past scientific achievements, 
achievements that some particular 
community acknowledges for a time 
as supplying the foundation of its 
practice. Today such achievements 
are recounted, though seldom in 
their original form, by science 
textbooks, elementary and 
advanced. These textbooks expound 
the body of accepted theory, 
illustrate many or all of its 
successful applications and 
compare those applications with 
exemplary observations and 
experiments. ® 
Kuhn thus keeps his position by saying 
that normal science is carried out by scientific 
communities bound together by a common disciplinary 
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matrix, which is acquired through an apprenticeship 
characterized by the exemplars shared by the 
scientific as being archetypal of good science. 
According to the logical 
empiricist's tradition, the empirical or 
observational content of the symbolic 
generalization in a theory is fully or partially 
specified by correspondence rule which explicitly 
states the allowed methods for attaching the 
generalization to phenomena and also supply the 
various theoretical terms in the generalization 
with their empirical interpretation or meaning. 
Kuhn rejects this account, arguing instead that a 
new theory is always announced together with 
exemplary applications to some concrete range of 
natural phenomena. ^ That is, a theory is always, 
advanced in conjunction with various exemplars 
which are presented as an archetypal application of 
the theory to phenomena. Furthermore, since 
exemplars indicate the sorts of questions to be 
asked and the kinds of answer to be given, 
different communities with different stocks of 
shared exemplars will disagree on what questions 
ought to be asked and what count as solutions to 
these questions. So in short, they disagree on what 
constitutes good science even if they are concerned 
with the same phenomena. That is depending on one's 
exemplars one has different scientific value. What 
are characteristics of a scientific community, 
then, is a commonly held disciplinary matrix, which 
is acquired by the mastery of the scientific 
community's shared stock of exemplars. Normal 
science then is the science practiced by a 
scientific community whose common possession is a 
disciplinary matrix based on a shared stock of 
exemplars. Normal science is occupied with solving 
the open-ended problems or puzzles posed by the 
exemplars and disciplinary matrix based upon them. 
As such it is highly cumulative enterprise 
devoted to augmenting the critical success of the 
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exemplars in dealing with the problem area or class 
of phenomena. It's task being the extension and 
further articulation of the disciplinary matrix 
through the production of additional exemplars and 
the refinement of existing ones. It does not aim at 
the production of novelties of fact or theory 
rather its aim is to show that nothing is novel, 
that everything is in accordance with its 
generalization as interpreted by the disciplinary 
matrix.^ It is the attempt to subsume an 
increasingly larger class of phenomena under the 
basic world view supplied by the evolving 
disciplinary matrix. 
But a time comes when normal science fails 
to accord with its expectation and anomalies are 
discovered which results a scientific crisis. Such 
crisis sets a stage for scientific revolution. So 
the scientific revolution is a stage when the 
worldview supplied by normal science and its shared 
disciplinary matrix no longer seems adequate to 
20 
cope with all the phenomena. Thus the scientific 
community begins to loose faith though they do not 
renounce the theory that led them into crisis. So 
the decision to reject one theory for another is 
always simultaneously the decision to accept 
another. Thus, before a disciplinary matrix is 
rejected, a replacement must emerge and the 
scientific revolution consists in the switch of 
allegiance from the old to the replaced one. Kuhn 
calls this replacement as paradigm shift. ^° This 
replacement will be the product of extraordinary 
research. Different scientists work from within 
different ones of the proliferating disciplinary 
matrices, each using different rule for research 
which means that different scientists look at the 
field in different ways. The proliferation of 
competing articulation, the willingness to try any 
thing, the expression of explicit discontent, all 
these are symptoms of a transition from normal to 
extraordinary research. "^•' 
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Kuhn says that the old theory and the 
replaced one must be logically in compatible. To 
accept the new theory is to accept the new symbolic 
generalization and certain applications of these 
generalizations as archetypal exemplars. Since the 
exemplars implicitly interpret the symbolic 
generalization and determine the meaning of the 
theoretical terms occupying in them, accepting the 
new theory requires accepting a new or altered 
vocabulary for viewing the world. So this change 
constitutes accepting or acquiring a new 
disciplinary matrix. So acceptance of new theory 
requires rejecting the old disciplinary matrix in 
favor of another. If the comparison does show the 
new theory better able to accommodate the phenomena 
than the old, then switch of allegiance to it and 
its associated disciplinary matrix by an increasing 
proportion of scientific community may result. 
Thus the scientific revolution is 
completed when most of the scientific community has 
22 
switched allegiance to the new disciplinary matrix, 
at this point the scientists once again bound 
together by common disciplinary matrix and are 
engaged in doing normal science/^ 
How do the possessors of the new 
disciplinary matrix differ from the old one? The 
new matrix may possess some of the old symbolic 
generalization, but will do so with changed 
meanings attached to the theoretical terms. For 
example, a relativity theory still employs 
classical equation of motion, but with different 
meaning, the equation being only approximations of 
limited scope to the generalization of relativity 
theory, but they are not the old classical laws 
since the key terms, "mass" and ''force" now have 
the new meaning of relativity theory. Hence, when 
revolution occurs the scientific advancement which 
results is not cumulative, rather it is a 
fundamentally reorientation of the science which 
requires rejecting the old science for new. 
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The conceptual changes, which come from 
accepting a new disciplinary matrix, are a gestalt 
switch; two observers looking at the same things 
from within different disciplinary matrixes see 
different things. Though the world does not change 
with a change of disciplinary matrix, the 
scientists afterwards work in a different world. ^"^  
So we see that Kuhn' s account of science 
fundamentally depends on the distinction between 
normal science and revolutionary science and his 
account of revolution as involving conflict between 
incommensurable disciplinary matrixes. 
Kuhn says; ^^  The normal scientific 
tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution 
is not only incompatible but often actually 
incommensurable with that which has gone before."^ ^ 
There are number of sources for the 
doctrine of incommensurability. In order to bring 
them into focus I will consider briefly the chief 
sources. 
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The first source of incommensurability 
will be referred to as incommensurability due to 
value variance. Kuhn takes it that in some cases 
the disagreement between scientists as to which of 
a pair of theories to prefer arises from 
disagreement about values. In his postscript, he 
writes: 
What it should suggest, 
however, is that such reasons 
[accuracy, simplicity, 
fruitfulness and the like] 
function as values and men who 
concur in honoring them can thus 
differently apply them, 
individually and collectively. If 
two men disagree, for example 
about the relative fruitfulness of 
their theories, or if they agree 
about that but disagree about the 
relative importance of 
25 
fruitfulness and, say, scope in 
reaching a choice, neither can be 
convicted for a mistake. Nor is 
either being unscientific. "^^  
Kuhn is advancing two claims, which if 
accepted would generate some incommensurability. 
Where incommensurability is understood as 
indicating a limitation on the possibility of 
making rationally justifiable choices between 
theories. The first claim is that in justifying 
my preference for one theory over another, I 
shall have to appeal to value judgement. The 
second is that value judgements are autonomous in 
the sense that no rational considerations can be 
adduced for favoring one value judgement over 
another. 
A second related source of 
incommensurability would arise if in some cases 
of scientific conflict, the rival scientists 
disagreed as to the principles of comparison and 
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there was no possibility of rationally justifying 
one of these sets of principles over the other 
even though the difference did not arise from a 
disagreement over values. In this event there 
would be cases of incommensurability in the sense 
that there would be no possibility of adducing 
rational consideration favoring one theory over 
another. This source of incommensurability is 
called as the incommensurability due to radical 
standard variance. 
The most extreme and most interesting 
source of incommensurability is called as radical 
meaning variance. It would be fruitful to start 
with a relatively modest version of the thesis 
that will be called the thesis of radical meaning 
variance of theoretical term. For the sake of the 
argument let us suppose that there is an 
observation- theory dichotomy and consider the 
radical meaning variance theory to be the thesis 
that the meaning of a theoretical term with in a 
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theory may change if certain alterations are made 
in that theory. Suppose, for instance, that the 
change from Newtonian mechanics to relativistic 
mechanics was of such a character that the 
meaning of "mass" changes radically. In this case 
there is only the appearance of logical 
incompatibility between the Newtonian assertions 
that, say mass is invariant and the relativistic 
assertion that, mass is not invariant. Before 
developing further the consequences of admitting 
this meaning variance, it will be instructive to 
consider the chain of reasoning that gave rise to 
the thesis of the radical meaning variance 
theory. To see this we need to begin with some 
reflections on the problems of the meaning of 
theoretical terms. In the positivistic tradition, 
theoretical terms were taken to be particularly 
problematic from the semantic point of view. 
Theoretical terms were problematic for, since 
they were not applied to items directly given in 
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experience as in the case of observational terms, 
which could be specified directly through their 
connection with experience. To understand the 
meaning of an observational predicate was to 
grasp the kinds of experience that constituted 
evidence for the application of a predicate and 
to grasp the kind of experience that constituted 
evidence against the application of the 
predicate, whereas in the case of theoretical 
terms their meaning could be specified in terms 
of antecedently understood observational terms. 
For, theoretical terms were to play a role in the 
explanation of observations and it was required 
to play a role in a theory. The response of this 
situation was to suppose that the meaning of the 
theoretical terms (T-terms) was implicitly 
defined through some of the postulates that are 
meaning postulates of the theory. Some postulates 
in this set would connect a theoretical term with 
other theoretical terms within the theory. Other 
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postulates would connect the theoretical term 
with observational term. On the meaning postulate 
approach it specifies concerning the meaning of 
theoretical terms. Consequently not all changes 
in theory involve changes in the meaning of 
theoretical term across the theories. For, on 
this account we might have two incompatible 
theories having the same meaning postulates set 
for theoretical terms. Thus the meaning postulate 
approach provides us with a framework within 
which it makes sense to ask if a given 
theoretical terms means the same within theory T-
1 as it does within theory T-2. 
Thus the meaning postulate approach 
applied to theoretical terms but not to 
observational terms provides us what we call the 
first degree of meaning variance. In these change 
theory changes, such as shift from Newtonian to 
Einstenian theories of mechanics does not 
necessarily produce changes in the meaning of 
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theoretical terms. Whether there is change in 
meaning depends on the particular changes made in 
the theory. In the philosophy of Carnap one can 
find the approach about the meaning variance of 
theoretical terms as the quotation below reveals: 
Perhaps the objection might be 
raised that, if significance is 
dependent upon theory (T) then any 
observation of new fact may compel 
us to take as non-significant, a 
term so far regarded as 
significant or vice versa. This 
class will generally be changed 
only when especially the 
introduction of a new theoretical 
and the addition of postulates 
make a radical revolution in the 
system of science, for that 
term. ^^ 
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Thus Carnap acknowledged the first degree 
of meaning variance and in doing so came to hold a 
view not dissimilar to Kuhn. For Kuhn maintained 
that meanings vary only across dramatic theory 
changes. If one rejected the assumption that there 
is a distinction in kind between meaning postulate 
and non-meaning postulate while retaining the 
general idea of the meaning postulate approach, 
that meaning of theoretical terms is to be 
specified through a specification of the role of 
the term in the theory, one would lead to embrace 
the second degree of meaning variance. The thesis 
of the second degree of meaning variance is that 
the meaning of all the theoretical terms changes 
under theory change while meaning of observational 
terms remains constant. 
In discussion of incommensurability there 
has been a tendency to focus on the question of 
meaning. Having reached the second degree of 
meaning variance we can articulate what the 
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problem of incommensurability has been supposed to 
do. Taking Einstenian and Newtonian theories as 
our examples, the problem can be posed as follows. 
Some of the theoretical assertions of Newton seem 
incompatible with some of the theoretical 
assertions of Einstein. For example Newton says 
mass is invariant and Einstein says mass is not 
invariant. These assertions represent mere 
equivocation. In fact the situation would be more 
perspicuously represented as follows: 
Mass-N (Newtonian mass) is invariant, 
mass-E (Einstenian mass) is not invariant. Since 
both the mass,here differ in meaning, these later 
assertions are not logically incompatible. If this 
applies to all theoretical terms Einstein and 
Newton are not contradicting. At the second degree 
of meaning variance it is taken that observational 
term has invariant meaning across theory change. 
This would give a way, which theories could be, 
contradictories of one other notwithstanding the 
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variation in the meaning of the theoretical terms. 
The assumptions that there is a difference in kind 
of either an epistemological character or a 
semantical character between so called 
observational statement and so called theoretical 
statement is untenable. 
Given the second degree of meaning 
variance, rejecting the observational- theoretical 
distinction leads to third degree of meaning 
variance. In this third degree it is taken that 
the meaning of all terms is determined through 
their role in a theory with the consequence that 
any change in the theory brings a change in the 
meaning of all terms. But for Kuhn, we have the 
third degree of meaning variance only in the case 
of paradigm shift. So the model of science which 
Kuhn sees has been explicated in terms of his 
notion of a paradigm. 
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Chapter-3 
Chapter 3 
Post kuhnian philosophers of science 
In this chapter, the author is going to 
discuss some post Kuhnian thinkers such as Imre 
Lakatos, Larry Lauden, C. R. Kordig, Mark. A. 
Stone, John watkin. 
Imre Lakatos: 
In the previous chapter, it has been 
explored that ''meaning variance" occurs in the form 
of "paradigm shift". Lakatos was not interested in 
question of meaning as such and for this reason he 
did not take up the challenges by the arguments for 
incommensurability. Rather he was particularly 
concerned with the question of how he could 
vindicate his principles of comparison (his 
methodology). 
According to his methodology the great 
scientific achievements are research programs. The 
methodology of scientific research programs is to 
be used in making action guiding decision with 
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regard to theory choice in contemporary science.''" 
Lakatos says that research program can be evaluated 
in terms of progressive and degenerating problem 
shift and scientific revolution consists of one 
research program superseding another. But a 
research program is said to be progressive as long 
as its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical 
growth, that is, as long as it keeps predicting 
novel facts with some success. In other words, it 
can be said that within a research program a theory 
can only be eliminated by a better theory, by one 
which has excess empirical content over its 
predecessors. Though his methodology of research 
program was criticized by both Feyerabend and Kuhn. 
According to Kuhn, Lakatos must specify criteria 
which can be used at the time to distinguish a 
degenerative from a progressive research program 
and so on^ otherwise he (Lakatos) has told us 
nothing at all. Lakatos otherwise says that he 
begins his reworking of Kuhnian paradigm into 
39 
research program and sees the rationality of 
science in his scientific research programs. The 
relative merits of which can be compared and 
assessed. He defined research programs in terms of 
problem shift. Let Ti, T2, T3, be a series 
of theories where each subsequent theory results 
from the semantically reinterpretation of the 
previous theory in order to accommodate some 
anomaly, where each theory in the series has as 
much empirical content as the unrefuted content of 
its predecessor. The problem shift is said to be 
progressive if it is both theoretically and 
empirically progressive, otherwise it is 
degenerating.^ 
In mature science he says, the series of 
theories are generated in accordance with research 
program having "heuristic power".^ Such research 
programs consists of methodological rule for the 
development of problem shift; these rules comprise 
a negative heuristic that tells us what path of 
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research to avoid and positive heuristic tells us 
what path to persue.^ We can say in other words 
that criteria of positive heuristic power strongly 
depends upon how it construct factual novelty. 
Further Lakatos says that his research program may 
be characterized by their hard core. The negative 
heuristic specifies the hard core of the program 
which is irrefutable by the methodological decision 
of its proponents while the positive heuristic 
consists of a articulated set of suggestion or hint 
regarding the development of research program.^ 
According to Lakatos we are to compare 
theories by examining the track record of the 
scientific research program within which the 
theories are embedded in the hope that the past 
record is indicative of the future success rate. To 
do this we attempt to discover how successful the 
rival program has been in generating true novel 
predictions. A preliminary problem is that the 
explanation of a known fact can be as important in 
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providing evidence for a theory as the generation 
of true novel predictions, Lakatos further does 
argue that his account of science and his 
methodology of research program is superior to 
other because the rationale involves is effective 
to solve the anomalies. The famous dictum is that 
''philosophy of science without history of science 
is empty; history of science without philosophy of 
science is blind."^ For Lakatos, the history of 
science gives philosophy of science its content 
through providing the test between the rival 
methodologies. 
All methodologies 
function as historiographical or 
metahistorical theories or 
research program and can be 
criticized by criticizing the 
rational historical reconstruction 
to which they lead.^ 
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That is we compare rival methodologies by 
comparing the different historical accounts 
(rational reconstruction) to which their use gives 
rise. 
Progress in theory of 
scientific rationality is marked 
by discoveries of novel historical 
facts, by the reconstructing of a 
growing bulk of value impregnated 
history as rational. ^  
Lakatos argues that his methodology is 
superior and appealing to other methodologies 
because it is supposed to be used by the scientist 
and it must bear relation to what they in fact 
regard as the good making feature of theories. He 
further says that it would be wrong to assume that 
one must stay with a research program until it has 
exhausted all its heuristic power, that one must 
not introduce a rival program before everybody 
agrees that the point of degeneration has probably 
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been reached. Although one can understand the 
irritation of a physicist when, in the middle of 
the progressive phase of a research program, he is 
confronted by a proliferation of vague metaphysical 
theories stimulating no empirical progress. "^° One 
must never allow a research program to become a 
Weltanschauung or a sort of scientific rigor 
setting up itself as an arbiter between explanation 
and non explanation, as mathematical rigor sets 
itself up as an arbiter between proof and non 
proof. Lakatos reacts here and says that 
unfortunately this is the position, which Kuhn 
tends to advocate. Indeed what he calls normal 
science is nothing but a research program that has 
achieved monopoly. Thus Lakatos establishes that 
the history of science have been and should be a 
history of competing research program. He further 
makes question that, can there be any objective 
reason to reject a program, that is to eliminate 
its hard core for constructing protective belts? 
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The answer lies is that such a objective reason is 
provided by a rival research program which explains 
the previous success of its rival and supersedes it 
by a further display of heuristic power. However 
the criterion of heuristic power strongly depends 
on how we construe factual novelty. But the novelty 
of a factual proposition can frequently be seen 
only after a long period has elapsed. 
All the Lakatos' position suggests that we 
must not discard a budding research program simply 
because it has so far failed to over take a 
powerful rival. We should not abandon it, if 
supposing its rival was not there, it would 
constitute a progressive problem shift. And we 
should regard a newly interpreted fact as a new 
fact. 
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10. This is what must have irritated Newton most 
in the sceptical proliferation of theories by 
Cartesians. 
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Larry Laudan 
So far we have seen the view of Lakatos 
related to the to the problem of meaning and how 
he out lined his research program in comparison to 
kuhn's paradigm shift, here are the findings of 
Laudan that how he has emerged with he has new 
account which was termed as Research tradition, a 
primary tool for understanding and appraising 
scientific progress. 
Before I go into the details of Laudan' s 
programs, I will see first how he looks the 
development made by both kuhn and Lakatos . 
As we have seen earlier, kuhn offers a 
model of scientific progress whose primary element 
1 
IS the "paradigm". Once a paradigm is accepted by 
scientists, they can proceed with the process of 
"Paradigm articulation", known as normal science. 
In periods of normal science, the dominant 
paradigm will itself be regarded as unalterable 
and immune from criticism .It remains so until 
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enough anomalies accumulate, then scientists begin 
to ask whether the dominant paradigm is really 
appropriate. Kuhn calls this time a period of 
crisis. During a crisis, scientists begin to 
consider seriously alternative paradigms. If one 
of those prove to be more empirically successful 
than the former paradigm, a scientific revolution 
occurs, a new paradigm is enthroned, and another 
period of normal science ensues. Here Laudan says 
that despite of all its strengths, Kuhn's model of 
scientific revolution suffers- from acute 
conceptual and empirical difficulties. He . then 
outlined the serious flaws in Kuhnian program, the 
2 
most significant are belowr 
1. Kuhn never really resolves the crucial 
question of the relationship between a 
paradigm and its constituent's theories. Do 
theories, once developed, justify the 
paradigm, or does the paradigm justify them? 
Laudan says, it is not clear in Kuhn's case. 
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2. Kuhn's paradigms have a rigidity of 
structure, which precludes them from evolving 
through the course of time in response to the 
weakness, and anomalies, which they generate. 
Moreover, he makes the core assumption of the 
paradigm; there can be no corrective 
relationship between the paradigm and the 
data. Accordingly, it is very difficult to 
square the inflexibility of Kuhnian paradigms 
with the historical fact. 
3. Kuhn's paradigm^ are always implicit, never 
fully articulated. As a result, it is 
difficult to understand how he can account 
for many theoretical controversies, which 
have occurred in the development of science. 
4. Because paradigms are so implicit and can 
only be identified by pointing to their 
exemplars (basically an archetypal 
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application of a mathematical formulation to 
an experimental problem), it follows that 
whenever two scientists utilize the same 
example, they are, for Kuhn committed to the 
same paradigm. Such an approach ignores the 
fact that different scientists often utilize 
the same laws or exemplars. To this extent, 
analyzing, science in terms of paradigms is 
unlikely to reveal that it is a strong 
network of commitments - conceptual, 
theoretical, instrumental which Kuhn hoped. 
In response to Kuhn's assault on the 
traditional philosophy of science, Imre Lakatos 
has developed an alternative view about the 
progress in science and that is through research 
program. Laudan says that Lakatos' model is in 
much respect an improvement on Kuhn. Lakatos 
discusses the historical importance of the 
coexistence of several alternative research 
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programs at the same time with in the same 
domain. Kuhn often takes the view that paradigms 
are incommensurable and thus not open to 
rational comparison. However Lakatos insists 
that we can objectively compare the relative 
progress of competing research programs. 
Lakatos' research program, like Kuhn's paradigms 
are rigid in their hard core structure. Moreover 
Laudan says that he is indebted pioneering work 
of Kuhn and Lakatos but tries to develop the 
notion of research tradition as an alternative 
model. According to him, a research tradition 
provides a set of guidelines for the development 
of specific theory. Laudan says that every 
research tradition will be associated with a 
series of specific theories, each of which is 
designed to particularize the ontology of the 
research tradition and to satisfy its 
methodology. The mechanistic research tradition 
in seventeenth century optics for example, 
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includes several of optical theories of Hooke, 
Rohault, and Huygens. Similarly the phlogiston 
tradition in eighteenth century chemistry 
received more than a dozen specific theoretical 
formulation. So the whole function of a research 
tradition is to provide us with the crucial tool 
we need for solving problem both empirical and 
conceptual. 
There are at least two specific modes by 
which theories and research traditions are 
related: one is historical and other is 
conceptual. It is a matter of historical fact tat 
most of the major theories of science have emerged 
when the scientist who invented them was working 
with in one or another specific research 
tradition. For example Boyle's theory of gases 
developed with in the framework of the mechanical 
understanding of the world. Hertz's electrical 
theories were linked in important ways with the 
Maxwellian research tradition. Thus a specific 
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theory, abstracted from its historical context may 
not give unambiguous clues as to the research 
tradition with which it is associated. It is in 
the sense, the connection between a theory and a 
research tradition is as real as any fact of the 
past. In order to see how important these 
connections are, we need to look at the ways in 
with theories and research tradition interacts. 
The problem determining role of the 
research tradition: Even before specific theories 
are formulated with in a tradition, the research 
tradition will strongly influence the range. So 
the research traditions have a decisive influence 
on what can count as the range of possible 
conceptual problems which the theories in that 
tradition can generate. 
Further Laudan says that the primary 
function of a research tradition is to establish a 
general ontology and methodology for tackling all 
the problems of a given domain or set of domains': 
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The research tradition can play a vital heuristic 
role in the construction of specific scientific 
theories. Consider the case of Benjamin Franklin 
and his efforts to articulate a theory of static 
electricity. ^Franklin was familiar with certain 
phenomena (particularly electrification by 
friction, electroscopes, and the leyden jar) . 
Working within a research tradition which 
postulated the existence of electrical matter, 
Franklin needed a theory which could explain how 
friction electrifies bodies, how electrical bodies 
could attract and repel, how electricity could be 
stored in a condenser and why certain bodies were 
conductors others were insulators. In the early 
stages of the development of his theory, Franklin 
came to the view that the positive electrification 
consisted in the accumulation with in bodies of an 
excess amount of the electrical fluid, while 
negative electrification was caused by a 
deficiency of this fluid. These specific 
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theoretical assumptions are linked together with 
the ontology of research tradition, an ontology 
which postulated that electricity was a form of 
matter and therefore conserved in the same way 
that ordinary matter was, it became natural to 
assume that electrical charge must be conserved. 
This important theoretical insight subsequently 
confirmed in Franklin experiment and emerged as an 
inevitable result of Franklin's thinking about the 
relation between his theory and its parent 
research tradition. 
Laudan also quotes another example. When 
Sadi Carnot set out to develop a theory of steam 
engines, he sought to do so with in the research 
tradition of caloric doctrine of heat. With in 
this tradition, heat was conceived as a material, 
conserved substance capable of moving between the 
constituent parts of microscopic bodies. Carnot, 
familiar with the work that could be performed by 
such simple mechanical system as a water wheel. 
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tried to conceive of heat flow on analogy with the 
fall of water, with the temperature gradient 
between input and output corresponding to the top 
and bottom heights of the water fall. It is in 
terms of this analogy that Carnot develops the 
proof of his theory. Thus it is clear here that, 
if Carnot had not conceived of heat as a conserved 
substance capable of flowing from one point to 
another without loss of its quality, he could not 
have enunciated his theory. But that way of 
conceiving heat was natural result of the research 
tradition with in which Carnot worked. In both the 
cases above, the research tradition functions 
heuristically to suggest an initial theory for 
some domain. Research traditions, as we have seen 
are historical creatures. They are created and 
articulated with in a particular intellectual 
milieu. They aid in generation of specific 
theories. But Laudan says that there is another 
important way in which research traditions evolve. 
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These changes involve not the specific theories 
with in the research tradition but a change of 
some of its most basic core elements. Laudan 
discusses this type of transformation in some 
detail since there are philosophers who have 
denied that research traditions are capable of any 
significant internal modification. For instance, 
both Kuhn and Lakatos usually suggest that entity 
such as research traditions have rigid and 
unchanging set of doctrines, which identify and 
define them. Any change in those doctrines 
produces a different research tradition. Laudan 
argues that we must reject it for it can create 
confusion in our effort to get some understanding 
of the historical processes of science. Laudan 
says that if one looks at the great research 
tradition in the history of scientific thought for 
example Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, 
Newtonianism, one can see that there is scarcely 
any interesting set of doctrines which 
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characterizes any one of these research tradition 
through out the whole of its history. Certain 
Aristotelian, at times, abandoned the Aristotelian 
doctrine that motion in a void is impossible. 
Certain Cartesians repudiated the Cartesian 
identification of matter and extension. Certain 
Newtonian abandoned the Newtonian demand that all 
matter has inertial mass. So the core assumptions 
of any given research tradition are continuously 
undergoing conceptual scrutiny. In such 
circumstances, it is common for partisans of a 
research tradition to explore what sort of changes 
can be made in the ontology of that research 
tradition to eliminate the anomalies and 
conceptual problems confronting its constituent 
7 
theories. 
Oftenly scientists find that by 
introducing one or two modification in the core 
assumption of the research tradition they can both 
solve the outstanding anomalies and conceptual 
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problems. For this research tradition must be 
carefully evaluated to come to its hope for 
achieving the goal (problem solving adequacy). 
Laudan gives two quite different contexts. One is 
the context of acceptance and another is the 
context of pursuit. In the former case, scientists 
often choose to accept one among a group of 
competing theories and research tradition. There 
is a whole range of possible answers here. 
Inductivists will say, choose the theory with the 
highest degree of confirmation or choose the 
theory with the highest utility. Falsificationists 
say, choose the theory with the greatest degree of 
falsif lability. Others such as Kuhn would say no 
rational choice could be made. But Laudan replies 
that choose the theory or research tradition with 
the highest problem solving adequacy. Thus Laudan 
establishes that the rationale for accepting or 
rejecting any theory is fundamentally based on the 
idea of problem solving. If one research tradition 
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has solved more important problems than its rivals 
have, then accepting that tradition is rational 
precisely to the degree we are aiming to progress. 
This way of appraising research tradition 
according to Laudan has three distinct advantages. 
(1) It is workable unlike both inductivist and 
falsificationist model. 
(2) It simultaneously offers an account of 
rational acceptance. 
(3) It comes closer to being widely applicable to 
the actual history of science. 
The context of pursuit; So far as we have 
seen an adequate account of theory choice, but 
according to Laudan we are still very far from 
pursuing a full account of rational appraisal. The 
research for this is that there are many important 
situations where scientists evaluate competing 
theories by criteria, which have nothing to do 
with the acceptability of the theories, in 
question. The actual occurrence of such situations 
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has often been observed. For example when we look 
to Copernicanism, the early stages of the 
mechanical philosophy, the atomic theory in the 
first half of 19^^ century, the preliminary efforts 
at the quantum mechanical approach to molecular 
structure. We see the same pattern that scientists 
often begin to pursue and to explore a new 
research tradition long before its problem solving 
success, qualifies it to be accepted over its 
older rivals. Since the central aim of science is 
to provide the solutions of a maximum number of 
empirical problems and anomalies. This view 
entails that' we should accept at any time the 
theories or research traditions, which have shown 
themselves to be the most successful problem 
solvers. 
Suppose we have two competing research 
traditions RT and RT'"' and the momentary adequacy of 
RT is much higher than that of RT""- but the rate of 
progress of RT"^  is greater than the related value 
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of RT. So far as acceptance is concerned, RT is 
clearly the only acceptable one of the pair but on 
the other hand RT"^  has shown itself to be capable 
of generating new solutions to problems. This 
would be appropriate if RT"^  is a relatively new 
research tradition. 
Thus Laudan establishes that it is always 
rational to prove any research tradition which has 
a higher rate of progress than its rivals. So we 
see that rational persuitability of a research 
tradition is determined by the rate of progress it 
has exhibited. But what should be the guiding 
principles for rationality? Laudan has provided 
the following criteria. 
1. In the case of Competing scientific research 
traditions, if one of those traditions is 
compatible with the most progressive 
worldview available, and the stir is not, 
then there are strong grounds for preferring 
the former. 
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2. If both (competing scientific research 
traditions) can be legitimated with reference 
to the same worldview, then the rational 
decision between them may be made on entirely 
scientific grounds. 
3. If neither competing scientific research 
tradition is competable with a progressive 
world view, their proponents should either 
articulate a new progressive world view which 
does justify them or develop a new research 
tradition which can be made compatible with 
the most progressive extant world view. 
So, instead of defining progress in terms 
of rationality, he defines rationality in terms of 
progress. Laudan's expression has two main themes 
that any adequate model of science must 
recognize and be able to accommodate scientific 
change and that rationality and progress are 
linked with the problem solving effectiveness of 
theories. 
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By taking into account of scientific 
change generated by revolutionary camp, (such as 
Kuhn, Feyrabend, and other) Laudan argues that 
their views leads them to conclude that the 
history of science is nothing but a succession of 
different world views and that rational change can 
never be made between such divergent schemes of 
the universe, because each has its own internal 
rationale and integrity, no meaning can be* 
attached to the suggestion that one scheme is more 
or less rational than another. 
If there are no conceivable grounds for 
rational choice between competing research 
tradition then science will bear unaccountability. 
This means that tradition, which happens to 
attract the most influential adherents, will 
become influential. But before one accept this 
depressing conclusion that science proceeds in 
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this way, it is worth examining with some core and 
the arguments. 
The central argument runs like this: 
Scientific theories implicitly define the terms, 
which occur within them. Hence, if two theories 
are different then all the terms within them must 
have different meanings. Thus when an Einstenian 
physicist refers to the "mass" of a particle, he 
means something different from a Newtonian when 
the latter refers to the "mass" of a particle. As 
a result, scientists working in different research 
traditions cannot communicate with, and cannot 
understand the statements of their fellow 
scientists in other tradition. Given this general 
in comprehensive, science emerging as a new 
version which employs that theories cannot be 
compared and rationally evaluated because such 
comparisons require a common language. 
Laudan holds this above argument to be 
[o 
faulty in several respects. It bags a number of 
66 
questions about synonymy and translation. But its 
central flaw, for one purpose, lies in its 
presumption that rational choice can be made 
between theories only if those theories can be 
translated into one another's language or into a 
third, "theory-neutral language". 
As Kuhn puts the point, "The comparison 
of two successive theories demands a language into 
which at least the empirical consequences of both 
can be translated without loss or change. 
Laudan, on the contrary maintained that 
even if we accept the view that all observations 
are theory laden to a degree that makes their 
contents inseparable from the theory that is used 
to express them, it is still possible to outline 
machinery for objective rational comparison 
between competing scientific theories and research 
traditions. Laudan mentioned two arguments for 
such a conclusion: 
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1. The argument from problem solving: Logical 
positivists argued that competing theories could 
be evaluated by comparing their observational 
consequences. 
They usually conceived correspondence rule 
for the process of translating the competing 
theories into some purely observational language 
because observational language was held to be 
frame of any speculative theoretical basis. It was 
thought to provide objective grounds for the 
empirical appraisal of vying theories. As doubts 
grew about the existence of correspondence rule 
and about the theory-true observational language, 
philosophers from revolutionary camp such as Kuhn, 
Feyrabend and others suggested that theories were 
incommensurable and not open to objective 
comparison. 
But in comparison of the above two 
arguments (logical positivist and post 
positivists) Laudan holds another view and says 
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that neither correspondence rules nor a theory-
true observation language are necessary for 
comparing the empirical consequences of competing 
theories. He says that without correspondence 
rulers and without a purely observational language 
we can talk meaningfully about different theories 
being about the same problem, even when the 
specific characterization of that problem is 
dependent upon many theoretical assumptions. If a 
problem can be characterized only within the 
language and the framework of a theory, which 
purports to solve it, then clearly no competing 
theory could be said to solve the same problem. 
However, so long as the theoretical assumptions, 
necessary to characterize the problem are 
different from the theories, which attempt to 
solve it, then it is possible to show that the 
competing explanatory theories are addressing 
themselves to the same problem. Consider a very 
elementary example. Since antiquity, scientists 
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have been concerned to explain why light is 
reflected off a mirror or other polished surface 
according to a regular pattern. Relating the 
incident to the reflected angle, the problem of 
reflection thus characterized, involves many 
quasi-theoretical assumptions, such as; light 
moves in a straight line, that certain obstacles 
can change the direction of a ray of light, that 
visible light does not continuously fill easy 
medium etc. Does the existence of these 
theoretical assumption entails that no two 
theories can be said to solve the problem of 
reflection? The answers is clearly, provided that 
theories which solve the problem are not 
inconsistent with those relatively low level 
theoretical assumptions required to state the 
problem. Laudan says that he does not mean to 
suggest that all the problems which a theory or 
research tradition attempts to solve can be 
characterized independently of the theory which 
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solves them. The determination of the independence 
of any specific problem must depend upon the 
particularities of the case. 
He further says that there are far more 
problems common to competing research traditions 
than there are problems unique to a single one. 
These shared problems provide a basis for a 
rational appraisal of the relative problem solving 
effectiveness of competing research traditions. 
Laudan criticized Kuhn and said that he 
has been misled by his discovery that some 
empirical problems are not jointly shared between 
traditions or paradigms into believing that no 
problems are identical. 
2. The arguments from progress: It was observed 
that rationality consisted in accepting those 
research traditions which had the highest problems 
solving effectiveness. Now, an approximate, 
determination of the effectiveness of a research 
tradition can be made within the research 
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tradition itself, without reference to any other 
research tradition. 
Laudan simply asks whether a research 
tradition has solved the problems which it set for 
itself, he further asks whether in the process, it 
generated any empirical anomalies or conceptual 
problems. In this way, Laudan says we can come up 
with a characterization of the progressiveness (or 
regressiveness) of the research tradition. 
He says that, if we did this for all the 
major research traditions in science, then we 
should be able to construct something like a 
progressive ranking of all the research traditions 
of a given time. It is thus possible at least in 
principle and perhaps eventually in practice to be 
able to compare the progressiveness of different 
research traditions. He says that, even if we 
could not in principle ever find a way of 
translating Newtonian Mechanics into relativistic 
mechanics; if we could never find a way of 
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comparing the claim of twentieth century particle 
physics with nineteen^ century atomigj^, then it 
would still be possible to make an assessment on 
rational grounds of the relative merits of these 
research traditions. Thus Laudan established that 
we can compare theories with respect to their 
internal consistency or coherence and possible 
incommensurability of theories and research 
traditions does not preclude the existence of 
comparative appraisal of their acceptability. 
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C R KORDIG 
Among the post Kuhnian philosophers, C. R. 
Kordig also enjoys an important position. Kordig 
does repudiate the Kuhnian position on meaning 
variance theory. However he points out that 
meaning variance theory does not yield desirable 
consequences. He sketched various undesirable 
consequences to establish his position of meaning 
invariance and suggested an alternative account 
for the comparison of theories through appeal to 
first level and second level invariance. Thus he 
holds his position in opposition to widely 
influential views of Kuhn which maintains that 
transition from one scientific paradigm to another 
force a change in the meaning of the terms 
employed which is radical enough to preclude the 
possibility of comparison of scientific theories 
from different traditions. For example according 
to Kuhn and also by Feyerabend, the meaning of 
"mass" (among other terms) has radically and 
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incommensurably changed meaning in the transition 
from classic to relativistic mechanics."'' 
The dependence on velocity and 
convertibility with energy are built into the 
relativistic concept of "mass." 
Kordig finds that the philosophical 
interpretation of such example is implausible so a 
deeper objection against meaning variance thesis 
was raised by him which are being explained as 
under. 
The first methodologically implausible 
consequences of the doctrine of radical meaning 
variance is that if it were true then no theory 
could be consistent or contradict with another. 
(When a new theory Tl emerges to replace an old 
one T, the terms involved both theoretical and 
observational will change in such a way that there 
will be an elimination of old meaning - this is 
the view of the proponents of radical meaning 
variance theory.^ Here two different 
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incommensurable concepts will emerge out by the 
same term employed in both cases. Hence Tl and T 
could not contradict each other or mutually be 
inconsistent. 
For further elaboration Kordig quoted the 
Bohr theory of atoms which assumes that electron 
revolves about the nucleus of an atom in such a 
way that their orbital angular momentum is 
quantized (it is a whole multiple of \\/2ii, where h 
is Plank's constant); it also assumes that energy 
is radiated or absorbed by the atom only when an 
electron jumps from one stable orbit to another 
and that this energy is also quantized. When the 
Bohr theory claims that angular momentum and 
radiant energy of electrons cannot have continuous 
values but must be quantized, it denies the 
assumption of classical electrodynamics that 
angular momentum and radiant energy of electrons 
can have continuous values. I will further explain 
the classical electrodynamics in comparison to 
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Bohr's theory of atom to present the ground 
reality towards the claim of Kordig. According to 
classical electrodynamics the angular momentum of 
moving electron around the nucleus is not 
quantized (i.e. it is not integral multiple of 
h/2Tr) . When electron jumps from lower energy level 
to higher energy level there is loss of energy in 
the form of radiation which is termed as radiant 
energy but in this case it will be quantized. It 
can be presented mathematically, AE = hv =£2 - Ei 
where Ei is the first energy level and E2 is the 
second energy level. Here energy is proportional 
to frequency v^ ' . So it is continuous. But Bohr 
modified classical electrodynamics that angular 
momentum of a moving electron around the nucleus 
of an atom is not continuous but discontinuous 
(quantized) when electron jumps from lower energy 
state to higher energy state there is a loss of 
energy in the form of radiation and this radiant 
energy will be quantized because E=nhv where 
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n=l,2,3, . This energy will be only in the whole 
number not in fraction. So we see that the terms 
such as angular momentum, radiant energy used in 
Bohr's theory would be held to have different 
meanings from those in classical electrodynamics. 
Indeed they are to express incommensurable 
concepts, thus they could not contradict one 
another if the radical meaning variance thesis is 
true . 
The second methodologically unacceptable 
consequence of the doctrine of radical meaning 
variance is an extension of the first, which can 
be stated in the following way. If the doctrine 
were true then each scientist would be effectively 
isolated within his own system of meanings. Each 
of these meaning would be radically different from 
those of scientists within other traditions or 
from those of scientists holding other theories. 
True communication from one such system to another 
either in agreement or disagreement would be 
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impossible. Each as Scheffler points out would be 
"trapped in the web of his meaning"."^ 
Kuhn maintains that competing paradigms 
are addressed to radically different problems/ 
They incorporate radically different standard and 
even radically different definition of science. 
They are based on radically different meaning. 
But if this is so in what sense could such 
paradigms be said to be in competition? How could 
they be either rivals or alternatives? To maintain 
that they are in competition is to place them 
within some common framework, which has 
comparative and evaluative standard applicable for 
both. It is to consider them as oriented in 
somewhat different ways towards the same purpose 
and scientific goals. And it is the invention of 
alternatives for the purpose of mutual criticism 
which is central to Feyerabend's own positive 
methodology: 
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You can be a good empiricist only 
if you are prepared to work with 
many alternatives theories rather 
than a single point of view and 
experience.^ 
Given the radical meaning variance 
position, two different theories are radically 
different in meaning. It is thus hard to see how 
they could function as alternatives to each other 
or serve to criticize other, just as sociological 
theory and quantum theory which are radically 
different in meaning are neither alternative to 
each other nor serve to criticize one another. 
Feyrabend thinks that adopting the radical meaning 
variance position enables us to come closer to and 
more fully reach his goal. On the radical meaning 
variance view, theory displacement in science is 
held to affect observational as well as 
theoretical categories and notions. It follows 
that apparent sharing of observational terms by 
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theoretical opponents is really a delusion. If we 
are to understand another's observational or 
experimental claim, it is held that we must first 
accept his theory. Further it is held that if we 
are to understand another scientist's language we 
must share his theory; this means we must share 
certain deep features of his thought-world, his 
outlook, expectations and beliefs for it is only 
in terms of these. It is claimed that his language 
can be rendered intelligible. True communication 
between holders of different scientific theories 
thus becomes impossible. For a scientist of one 
tradition to significantly converse with an 
opposing theorist from another tradition on 
neutral ground becomes impossible. Kordig thus 
holds the view that radical meaning variance, as 
Feyrabend thinks is not methodologically 
desirable. 
There is a third methodologically 
undesirable consequence of the doctrine of radical 
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meaning variance. If the doctrine were true it 
would be difficult to see how one could learn a 
new theory. He could not learn it by having it 
explained to him using any scientific terms whose 
meanings he understood before he learned the new 
theory. Consider the term mass, velocity, and 
energy, which are used, in relativistic mechanics. 
The meaning of each of these terms, given the 
doctrine of radical meaning variance, is theory 
Laden. As Hanson would say, "The entire conceptual 
pattern of the game is implicit in each term"^. If 
so, then, in order to know what the terms of 
relativistic mechanics mean, I must know 
relativistic mechanics or at least its central 
principles. One of these central principles can be 
roughly expressed like this. '*Mass' is a function 
of velocity and is convertible with energy. 
But it is hard to know how I could 
understand what the above expression asserts 
unless I already to some degree know what the 
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term's man, velocity, energy mean. While radical 
variance theorists would hold that to learn what 
the terms mean I must learn the theory. To learn 
the theory, however, I must learn its central 
principles. But to learn the latter, it would seem 
that I must know what the terms involved mean. 
Given radical meaning variance, this circularity 
is vicious. In trying to circumvent, it is useless 
to appeal to what the terms mean in different 
theories. What they mean in any two theories is 
held to be radically different and 
incommensurable. Therefore Kordig says that one 
could not use any term whose meanings have 'been 
understood in order to learn the meaning of the 
terms in relativistic mechanics. Thus if the 
radical meaning variance accounts were correct, 
most scientific, looks would therefore end up 
useless in principle. 
So the finding of Kordig is that it is 
difficult to see how one could in any sense learn 
83 
a new theory by adopting the general radical 
meaning variance position. 
There is a fourth methodologically 
undesirable consequence of the doctrine of radical 
meaning variance position. If the doctrine were 
true, no scientific theory could be tested or 
falsified by any observation reports. Feyrabend 
and Kuhn would agree that without the help of 
other theories, no such theory could be falsified.^ 
As Feyrabend puts it: 
One most important point of 
agreement is the emphasis which 
both of us (Kuhn and Feyrabend) 
puts upon the need, in the process 
of the refutation of a theory for 
at least another theory.^ 
There exists facts that can not be 
unearthed except with the help of alternatives to 
the theory to be tested and that become 
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unavailable as soon as such alternatives are 
excluded.^ 
Both the relevance and the refuting 
character of many decisive facts can be 
established only with the help of other theories 
that, although factually adequate, are not in 
agreement with the view to be tested. Empiricism 
demands that the empirical contents of whatever 
knowledge we posses be increased as much as 
possible. ^° 
This implausible if the doctrine of 
radical meaning variance is correct, indeed it is 
inconsistent with the doctrine. 
A different theory Tl could not be used to 
show that observations exist which do not satisfy 
T. The concepts of Tl would be held to be 
incommensurable with those of T. Thus, satisfied 
prediction statements expressible in Tl could not 
be used as Feyrabend wishes them to be used. If 
they could then T and Tl would not be 
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incommensurable which is contrary to the radical 
meaning variance position. 
There is a fifth methodologically 
undesirable consequence of the doctrine of radical 
meaning variance. If it were true then there would 
be no sense left to the notion of a rational 
progression of scientific viewpoints from age to 
age. 
We had seen in the previous undesirable 
consequences related to the doctrine of radical 
meaning variance theorists that: 
1). Two different theories could 
neither agree nor disagree 
(contradictory). 
2) . That each scientist is effectively 
isolated with his own and unique system 
of meaning. 
3) . That no theory can be falsified or 
tested. 
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4). That scientists could not learn new 
and different scientific theories. 
Thus, Kordig finds that there is no sense to the 
customary notion of the rational progression of 
scientific viewpoints from age to age. He holds 
that when scientists choose one theory over 
another we could not claim that this choice 
constituted progress. For example we could not 
claim that the scientific community's choice of 
Einstein's theory over Newton's theory and of 
Kepler's theory over Brahe's theory constituted 
progress. Kordig examined this consequence and 
concluded that the problem arises because Kuhn 
gives no reason consistent with the rest of his 
positive which could serve as grounds for 
accepting one paradigm as better or more 
acceptable than another. Given his general 
position one could not say, in any ordinary 
sense, that progress is made when another 
replaces one paradigm through scientific 
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revolution. Why? Different paradigms radically 
disagree as to what are the facts, the problems 
faced, and the standards which the successfully 
theory must meet. A paradigm change brings about 
changes in the standards governing permissible 
problems, concepts and explanations."^^ Kuhn's 
position indeed tends towards the conclusion 
that the replacement of one paradigm by another 
is not commutative but is more replacement, mere 
change. If this is so two different paradigms 
could not be judged according to their ability 
to solve the same problems, deal with the same 
facts or concepts, or meet the same standards, 
for all of these are radically different for 
different paradigms. Such a conclusion is, 
however, inconsistent with the positive part of 
Kuhn's methodology. In discussing how paradigm 
disputes are finally resolved, "^  Kuhn draws 
attention to ''two all important conditions" 
which a new and successful paradigm will 
satisfy. First it will, resolve some outstanding 
and generally recognized problem that can be met 
in no other way. And second it will, "preserve a 
relatively large part of the concrete problem 
solving ability that has occurred to science 
through its predecessors". It will preserve a 
great deal of the most concrete parts of past 
achievement. However, neither of these, ''all 
these important conditions" could be met if the 
rest of the Kuhn's interpretation were correct. 
As scheffler has correctly noted: 
Such conditions of evaluation 
contradict the main thesis 
appealing to the history of 
science, namely, that paradigm 
change in science is not generally 
subject to deliberation and 
critical assesment. •^^  
So the consequence according to Kordig 
from methodological point of view for the radical 
89 
meaning variance position held by Kuhn is 
undesirable. He has a second sort of objection to 
the claim that if the radical meaning variance 
thesis were true then scientific change could not 
constitute progress. 
Toulmin claims, "^'^  in effect, that there is 
a special sense of progress and cumulative in 
which the radical meaning variance position does 
not entails that scientific change is non-
cumulative or non-progressive. After accepting the 
radical meaning variance thesis as to both 
observational and theoretical term, ^^  he exhibits 
some sensitivity to the problem how do we know 
which presupposition to adopt? Certainly, 
explanatory paradigms and ideals of natural order 
are not true or false in any naive sense. Rather 
they take us further (or less far) and are 
theoretically more or less f ruitful.-"-^  Given 
Toulmin's radical meaning variance position, it 
would be doubtful as Shapere has pointed out,"""^  
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whether there are shared ideals or standards which 
are invariant with respect to scientific 
revolutions. Therefore it would be doubtful 
whether different paradigms could be judged to be 
"more or less fruitful" in accomplishing common 
ta^Jks. For the same reason it wouldit doubtful 
whether there were common jobs that one paradigm 
could take us further towards than another. So the 
question that how theories can be judged against 
one another and how the replacement of one theory 
by another can be said to constitute progress or 
an advance remains unanswered. 
The sixth methodologically undesirable 
consequence of the doctrine of radical meaning 
variance position is perhaps the worst. The 
doctrine is demonstrably untenable because of a 
self-referential problem. 
For this, Kordig examines the position 
that there is no objectivity in science. Consider 
the claim that the choice between only scientific 
91 
theories is a matter of taste (as hold by 
Feyrabend) where, "neither proof nor error is at 
issue (Kuhn). Such a restricted claim is 
nevertheless problematic. It leads to an 
unjustified dualism. On the one hand we are 
supposed to hold that, "science is a subjective 
enterprise whose concepts and domain are theory 
laden. On the other hand we are supposed to also 
hold that the philosophy of science is an 
objective enterprise whose concepts and domains 
.are not theory laden. People who adhere to the 
earlier claim would to avoid the self referential 
problem and have to maintain that their own views 
of scientific change are uninfluenced by the fact 
that they are Kuhnians that is they would have to 
hold the latter claim. But what is the difference 
between these two domains? The answer is that non-
theory laden facts are relevant to the philosophy 
of science but not to science. Kuhn's and 
Toulmin's advocation of a purely descriptive 
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methodology for evaluating rival scientific 
theories are the last example here."^ ^ 
Therefore the doctrine of radical meaning 
variance is either demonstrably untenable or leads 
to neopositivistic aspects. 
So Kordig has suggested an alternative 
account which has distinct virtues and advantages. 
He has suggested that comparisons of different 
theories are possible since it is possible for 
them to be some shared meaning of the terms 
involve. 
But he urged that comparisons of different 
theories are in fact made through appeal to shared 
principles and meaning at both a "first" and 
''second" level. By shared meaning at a first level 
Kordig means shared extension of terms employed by 
rival theories and by shared principles and 
meaning at a second level he means shared 
regulative principles which scientists require of 
successful theories and which guide their choice 
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among alternative theories. Kordig argued that the 
''first level" in variance usually occurs in 
scientific transition. 
Let us consider the example of 
observational or experimental invariance, namely 
the transition from Galilean physics to Newtonian 
physics. Nagel thinks that the former science is 
reduced to the latter, ^^  which Feyrabend denies it"! 
As Feyrabend, ^^  correctly notes, Galilean 
physics dealt with the motion of material object 
(falling stones, penduli, balls on an inclined 
plane) near the surface of the earth. Its subject 
matter was a terrestrial object. It is possible to 
distinguish the subject matter of the Newtonian 
and Galilean science. The latter was concerned 
only terrestrial phenomenon and the former dealt 
also with the celestial phenomenon. Thus the 
subject matter of two sciences says are not 
coextensive. But since Newtonian physics also 
referred to material objects near the surface of 
94 
the earth, the subject matter of Galilean physics 
is a subset of the subject matter of Newtonian 
physics. The objects referred to by name of the 
terms employed by Ti (Galilean physics) are also 
referred to by some of the terms employed by T2 
(Newtonian physics). In the transition from Ti to 
T2 there is observational invariance and thus 
refers to extensional meaning invariance. As Nagel 
correctly notes in his discussion of the reduction 
of Ti to T2 , their subject matter are in an 
obvious sense homogeneous and continuous; for it 
is the motion of the bodies and determination of 
such motions that are under investigation in each 
case.^^ Using Feyrabend own words, we can describe 
the neutral observational objects in terms which 
are neutral to Ti and T2 . Both Ti and T2 refer to 
material objects such as falling stones, penduli, 
balls on inclined planes etc, each of which are 
near the surface of the earth. None of the terms 
used in this description are peculiar to only Ti 
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and T2, nor does the description presupposes 
meaning invariance between Ti and T2 . We have 
assumed only the ordinary English language meaning 
of these terms - whether or not they have the same 
meaning as their typographical counterparts, if 
any, either Ti and T2 . Thus in order to establish 
whether our description is correct and whether 
there exists observational invariance between Ti 
and T2 , one need not presuppose meaning invariance 
between Ti and T2 and our description, indeed, is 
correct as every historian of science would 
recognize. Therefore, there is observational 
invariance between Ti and T2. And hence there is 
also extensional meaning L • invariance 
between Galilean and Newtonian physics. Galilean 
idea of mass, acceleration, force were applicable 
to all bodies located near the surface of the 
earth, the Newtonian idea of gravitational force 
included these bodies within its range and of 
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course added celestial bodies as well. Margenau 
notes this point well: 
The Galilean ideas of mass and 
acceleration could be applied to a 
great variety of bodies, namely 
all those located near the surface 
of the earth. However, Newton's 
discovery of the law of universal 
gravitation was more extensible; 
it included within its range of 
celestial bodies. Bay seizing upon 
the idea of a gravitational force, 
Newton provided a concept of 
impressive width, thereby 
significantly advanced the science 
of mechanics. ^^ 
This overlap between the ontologies of Galilean and 
Newtonian physics is non-trivial. The class of all 
terrestrial objects is not a trivial or an 
insignificant class. And this class compromises 
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the overlap of the common objects dealt with by 
both of these physical theories. Terrestrial 
object is in each theory a correct answer to the 
question what moves? A term that illustrates non-
trivial is meaning invariance in both theories, 
therefore, inertia. There are other terms also 
which illustrates non-trivial meaning invariance. 
In both theories terrestrial objects undergo 
displacement. Similarly, in each theory 
terrestrial objects have mass, under go 
acceleration and undergo velocity. There is, 
therefore, also some non-trivial meaning 
invariance with respect to these phrases. There 
are our two examples of observational invariance 
for first level. 
Now we have to see the findings of Kordig for the 
second level discourse. He finds Kuhn's position 
regarding this as fallacious because Kuhn suggests 
that sharing of second order standard is 
impossible.^^ Kuhn feels that acceptance of a 
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paradigm entails acceptance of governing standards 
or criteria. One can then use these to justify his 
acceptance of the paradigm against its rivals. 
Because of this Kuhn maintains that different 
paradigm employ different standard at the second 
level of scientific discourse. He concludes that 
each paradigm is, in effect, fails justifying and 
provides science not only with a map but also with 
some of the directions essential for map making.^^ 
However the standards used to evaluate paradigms 
themselves are different in nature and function 
from the standards, internal to a paradigm. To say 
there are internal standards involved in a 
paradigm is just to say that the paradigm may be 
understood as defining, within some scientific 
domain, a range of legitimate problems along with 
approaches to and forms of solution. However, no 
set of mapping directions employs how it is itself 
to be evaluated in comparison with alternative 
sets rather as Scheffler notes, ^^  no such set 
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implies that it is itself superior to its 
alternatives. Thus it is in this sense, each 
paradigm is not self-justifying. 
So kordig suggested the second order standard for 
such task. These standards might then be used by 
philosopher of science as a philosophical 
rationale for the evaluation of a paradigm against 
one another. In the second order sense each 
paradigm is not self-justifying contrary to Kuhn, 
because his argument has not precluded neutrality 
or objectivity from playing a role in paradigm 
evaluation. He has not demonstrated that 
scientific transitions consist only in non-
cumulative persuasions and conversions. Kordig 
holds the view that at a second level standard, 
there should be some invariance with respect to 
scientific change. Shared second level standards 
are needed, and used, in the business of 
accepting, rejecting, and evaluating rival or 
competing theories. They serve to regulate the 
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choices among rival theories. He has briefly 
described several guiding principles. None is 
absolutely invariant each may change in time. But 
some accounts along with some illustrious from the 
history of science should show that they need not 
change with change in scientific theories, that 
changes in them proceed very slowly, and they are 
in fact usually invariant with respect to 
scientific transitions. It is through appeal to 
such shared standards that the shift of allegiance 
in the scientific community usually occurs. By 
drawing the work of Margenau, ^ ^ Kordig has briefly 
discussed the following. 
a. Empirical confirmation: A theory is confirmed of 
its consequences via the rules of 
correspondence. Further the theory that has 
sustained many circuits of empirical 
confirmation is usually promising for scientific 
acceptance. The range of application of 
101 
confirmation theory is designed to include any 
scientific theory. 
b. Logical fertility: Margenau expresses it by 
saying that hypothesis of scientific theory 
should obey logical laws.^^ If, for example, a 
scientific theory is logically inconsistent then 
this is ground for its rejection. Scientific 
theory should be coherent. Logical coherence is 
one of the regulative aims of science. This 
requirement can be shared by and used to 
evaluate different scientific theories. It is a 
demand, which is usually invariant with respect 
to changes of scientific theory. Even with 
respect to quantum mechanics where much valued 
logic has been considered, logical consistency 
has not been given up. 
c. Extensibility: Scientific theories should be 
extensible to as large as possible. Other 
regulative principles being equal, the more 
extensible is the better theory. On this score. 
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Newtonian mechanics, which dealt with both 
terrestrial and celestial objects, is a better 
scientific theory than Galilean mechanics which 
dealt only with the former objects. 
d. Multiple connections: Scientific theory should 
be organized and systematic. That is the 
constructs used in scientific theories should be 
multiple connected. Scientific hypothesis should 
be adhoc. Hempel^^ and Grubaum^° stresses this 
point well. 
e. Simplicity: It is often used as a regulative 
principle in evaluating rival scientific 
theories, is beyond doubt. This notion has often 
been appealed to as a basis for choosing among 
rival theories. The Copernicus revolution is a 
case in point. Copernicus, by placing the sun at 
the center of the planetary universe, was able 
to reduce the number of epicycle from 84 to 30. 
This eliminated a large number of unrelated 
epicycles, which has previously been needed to 
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explain the same observation. Perhaps because of 
this simplicity Copernican astronomy was more 
systematic and less adhoc than Ptolemic 
astronomy. And this too is a factor in comparing 
these theories, as Runder aptly puts it, "system 
is no more adornament of science, it is very 
least, "^"^  Simplicity is being deliberately 
conducted in a way, which would permit the 
application to more than one theory, 
f. Causality: Kordig argues with Margenau that 
causality is a metaphysical requirement. It 
demands that constructs should be so chosen as 
to generate causal laws. Holding the view of 
Margenau, Kordig regarded causality as a 
property of physical law and not as a relation 
between single observations. This regulative 
principle is met by both Galilean and Newtonian 
mechanics and by the scientific theories of both 
Brahe and Kepler. The principle was not 
abandoned in this transition, it continued to be 
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employed and was in fact fulfill by the laws of 
these theories. It was, therefore, invariant 
with respect to these scientific transitions. 
Thus Kordig holds that objectivity is an 
ideal, which is in fact employed in the scientific 
practice. Science is a systematic public enterprise 
that can be justified by reference to second level 
standards, logic, and empirical facts. Part of the 
purpose of science is to formulate truths about the 
natural world in a simple, comprehensive systematic 
and intelligible ways in which nature becomes 
explainable, predictable and controllable. The 
success of any particular scientific theory is a 
measure of how far, and how successfully, it 
contributes to the realization of the general 
second level aims of science. If significant first 
level sharing occurs between T and a competitor T'"' 
and if T takes us further in the direction of the 
above second level aims than T'^, then T should be 
52. 
accepted and T^  rejected. 
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Mark. A. Stone 
So far I have discussed the views of 
Lakatos, Laudan and Kordig. In this section, I 
shall examine the views of Mark. A. Stone. He holds 
that Kuhn and Lakatos are against the traditional 
views about science. Their criticism share two 
themes; first, that a scientific theory is not 
tested alone against empirical result and second, 
that one does not reject a theory without a 
successor at hand. In Kuhnian notion it is the 
paradigm of the theory that is either accepted or 
rejected while in Lakatos' terminology it is the 
research program of the theory that is either 
accepted or rejected with the condition that a 
successor must be available before the rejection of 
a paradigm or research program. 
He agrees with the view of F. M. Akeroyed who 
criticizes and holds opinion that there are 
occasion in the history of science when a research 
:10 
program is simply rejected and indeed rationally 
rejected despite the absence of a successor/ Mark 
Stone says that Kuhn is subject to the same 
criticism with respect to his favorite historical 
example of Copernican revolution. In his subsequent 
writings, Kuhn has identified two main sources of 
paradigm; the disciplinary matrix and the exemplars 
of a scientific community.^ This disciplinary 
matrix consists of those rules, some explicitly 
stated and some only implicitly understood that 
provide methodological guidelines to how research 
and experiments will be conducted and that will 
determine what will count, as legitimate problems 
for investigation by the community as well as 
criteria for legitimate problem solutions. In 
addition, the disciplinary matrix includes the 
metaphysical beliefs shared by the community about 
what sorts of entities are present in and what 
sorts of processes are at work in the world. 
Exemplars constitute a body of concrete examples of 
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successful problem solutions that provide the 
community with an understanding, largely implicit 
of its disciplinary matrix and the theories that 
are formulated within that disciplinary matrix. So 
the use of the term paradigm refers to the 
conjunction of disciplinary matrix-exemplars theory 
that constitute the discipline of a particular 
scientific community. Kuhn's evaluation is based in 
part on a linguistic thesis and in part on an 
epistemic thesis. The former asserts that meaning 
of a paradigm is holistic, one can not understand 
the belief or a assertion of a scientific community 
in isolation rather within a whole interrelated 
network of a paradigm. While the latter asserts 
that there is no paradigm independent foundation 
for theory, grounds for believing a theory and 
grounds for believing that certain empirical 
results require explanation and are based entirely 
on criteria internal to the paradigm of that 
theory. This is the basis on which Kuhn rejection 
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of prior verificationist / falsificationists 
approach lie. He summarizes his criticism of 
verificationism as follows: 
When paradigm enters, as they 
must, into a debate about paradigm 
choice, their role is necessarily 
circular. Each group uses its own 
paradigm to argue in that 
paradigm's defense.'^ 
Kuhn's rejection of the principle of 
falsiflability is more complex. Kuhn recognizes 
that no single observation that apparently 
contradicts the prediction made by the theory 
suffices as grounds for rejecting a theory. One can 
not neatly separate those observations that 
constitute problems yet to be solved from those 
that come to be recognized as genuine anomalies. As 
Kuhn says: 
There are, I think only two 
alternatives; either no scientific 
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theory ever confronts a counter 
instance, or all such theories 
confront counter instances at all 
times.^ 
Kuhn's argument here provides the basis 
for his claim that it is paradigm as a whole and 
not theories in isolation that are accepted or 
rejected. He further argues that a scientist does 
not reject one paradigm without simultaneously 
accepting another. Since Kuhn regards the 
possession of a paradigm as a necessary condition 
for practicing science at all, he concludes that, 
"To reject one paradigm without 
simultaneously substituting 
another is to reject the science 
itself. That act reflects not on 
the paradigm but on the man. 
Inevitably he will be seen by his 
colleague as the carpenter who 
blames his tool."^ 
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He further claims that, 
Once it has achieved the status of 
a paradigm, a scientific theory is 
declared invalid only if alternate 
candidate is available to takes 
its place. The decision to reject 
one paradigm is always 
simultaneously the decision to 
accept another, and the judgement 
leading to that decision involves 
the comparison of both paradigm 
with nature and with each other.^ 
But there is an important question here, if a 
scientist never abandons one theory until a 
successor is at hand, then where do successor 
theories come from? If scientists always accept the 
current paradigm until presented with an 
alternative, then it is unclear who will do the 
work to formulate an alternative. To answer this 
puzzle we must look in more detail at the process 
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of scientific discovery. The answer will show that 
at least in some cases, scientists can and must 
reject one paradigm without ready successor. 
At this juncture Mark A. Stone has 
established his sharp opinion and argued in the 
following way; He divided scientific discoveries 
into three types. First, at times revolutionary 
discoveries occur by accident. It has happened that 
a scientist will by chance stumble across a 
phenomenon so striking that he is compelled to 
adopt a new paradigm in-order to assimilate the new 
phenomenon. Mark Stone calls this spontaneous 
discovery. Second, at times revolutionary 
discoveries occur unnoticed. A scientist makes what 
he thinks is only a small addendum to some well 
established theory, and only later comes to realize 
that the implications of his modification require 
abandoning his previous paradigm. Mark Stone calls 
this implicit discovery. Finally, a scientist may 
perceive a felt need for a new discovery, set about 
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to find it, and succeed. Mark Stone calls this 
directed discovery. 
The discovery of x-rays is a 
typical example of spontaneous discovery. While 
doing routine experiments with cathode rays the 
physicist Roentgen observed that a barium platino 
cyanide screen in the laboratory began to glow 
whenever cathode rays were discharged. Weeks of 
investigation by Roentgen produced a rudimentary 
theory of x-rays. At first he refused to believe 
that cathode ray emissions were in fact 
responsible. However: further investigation, they 
required seven hectic weeks during which Roentgen 
rarely left the laboratory- indicated that the 
cause of glow came in straight lines from the 
cathode ray tube, that the radiation cast shadows, 
could not be deflected by a magnet, and much else 
beside.^ 
Thus Roentgen found himself in a situation 
in which the new phenomenon could only be 
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understood with the aid of the new paradigm. To 
accept a new phenomenon was in fact to accept a new 
paradigm. 
The process of implicit discovery accords 
with Kuhn's view. Mark Stone finds the example of 
this process in the origin of quantum theory. In 
1900 Plank was studying the phenomenon of black 
body radiation. A body such as an iron bar, when 
sufficiently heated goes through a spectrum of 
changes in color for dull red to bright white. 
Plank wanted to understand the relationship between 
the energy absorbed by the body and the radiation 
emitted by the body. Plank saw a connection between 
his problems and a problem to which Boltzamann had 
offered a new solution. Boltzamann was concerned 
with gases, not solid bodies. His question was: 
given the known average velocity of the molecules 
in a gas, what proportions of the molecules are 
moving at some multiple of that velocity? Boltzmann 
solution was original because of its application of 
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probability theory. He imagined a line segment 
scaled to the total kinetic energy of the molecules 
in the gas, so that one end point of the segment is 
zero and the other end point is E, where E stands 
for the total kinetic energy of the molecules. He 
then considered this segment be divided into 
finitely many smaller segments of equal size. What 
are the possible distributions of molecules among 
these cells, given that the sum of the kinetic 
energy for all molecules cannot exceed E? 
Boltzmannn was able to show that only certain 
distributions satisfied these restrictions and 
using probability theory he was able to show what 
the likelihood was that any given distribution 
would be represented in a gas. 
Plank made some theoretical assumptions 
that allowed him to treat the problem of blc^ ck body 
radiation like Boltzmann's problem. Plank theorized 
that a body was filled with what he called 
resonators, which resonate radiation only at a 
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particular frequency, and that the body as a whole 
would be filled with resonators covering the full 
operation of frequencies. Dividing the energy line 
segment into smaller segments as Boltzmann did, 
Plank then could ask what proportion of resonators 
fill along each smaller segment and apply 
probability theory to obtain a solution again just 
as Boltzmann had. 
This much of the story fits exactly the 
pattern of what Kuhn calls normal science. 
Certainly Plank saw nothing revolutionary in his 
theory. Indeed Plank did not immediately see any 
thing significant in the one additional restriction 
that he had to place on his theory that was not 
part of Boltzmann's solution: the unit sizes into 
which the energy line could be divided were not 
arbitrary, but were in fact dependent on the number 
we now know as a Plank's constant. 
In order to understand Plank's solution 
one had to accept that there were discrete jumps in 
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the energy level of an atom. This result was simply 
unintelligible by the standards of the existing 
paradigm. Assimilation of Plank's solution 
therefore required a new paradigm. The effect of 
implicit discovery is thus similar to the effect of 
spontaneous discovery. One either accepted the new 
problem solution, or thus accepted a new paradigm. 
There is no rejection of the older paradigm without 
simultaneous acceptance of the new paradigm. 
Mark. A. Stone holds that the significance 
of spontaneous and implicit discoveries are 
accidental and when he turned his attention towards 
directed discovery, he sees that Kuhn has 
overstated his statement. The historical example 
that Kuhn discusses most frequently, the Copernican 
revolution is an instance of this discovery. 
Copernicus the very famous astronomer judged that 
the Ptolemaic theory of celestial mechanics is 
unacceptable and he was firm in his conviction that 
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Ptolemy's theory had to be rejected. In his own 
words: 
The mathematicians are unsure of 
the movements of sun and moon that 
they cannot even explains or 
observes the constant length of 
the seasonal year. Secondly, in 
determining the motion of these 
and other five planets, they use 
neither the same principles and 
hypothesis nor the same 
demonstrations of the apparent 
motions and revolutions.^ 
So Kuhn says: 
''For the first time a technically 
competent astronomer had rejected 
the time honored scientific 
tradition for reason internal to 
his science, and this professional 
awareness of technical fallacy 
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inaugurated the Copernican 
revolution."^ 
So Mark Stone sees a clear refutation of 
Kuhn's own thesis that scientist never rejects one 
paradigm until a successor is at hand and yet 
Copernicus even by Kuhn's own admission has done 
precisely. Thus Mark Stone has established that 
Kuhn has made two mistakes in overlooking the 
significance of directed discoveries. First he has 
conflated two different sense of reject. Second he 
has failed to notice that within his own framework 
there is a room for an account of falsif lability 
that makes sense of directed discoveries. On the 
one hand "reject" can mean to find unacceptable. On 
the other hand "reject" can mean no longer make use 
of it. First is called by Mark Stone as epistemic 
rejection where rejection entails a change in 
belief. The second is called as pragmatic 
rejection, where rejection entails a change in 
action. Thus Mark Stone feels that Kuhn requires an 
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alternative account of falsiflability and rejection 
for cases of direct discoveries. So according to 
him Kuhn's views are threatening to the rationality 
of science as his claim between the case of 
Copernicus and Ptolemy has failed because of 
methodological stricture of Ptolemic paradigm was 
that planetary motion be accounted for, in terms of 
circular motion while Copernicus argued that 
Ptolemic theory had in effect failed to adhere the 
stricture. 
So the view being established here entails 
that Kuhn's old paradigm if altered requires new 
one has not a valid ground according to Mark Stone 
and he further says that if the revolutionary 
discovery is either spontaneous or implicit then 
the results are happened by chance and if the 
discovery is directed then it must be preceded by a 
rational procedure. 
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John Watkin 
John Watkin confronted with Kuhn's account 
of Normal science and ultimately disproved that 
Normal science constitutes the essence of science. 
He argued that Normal science could not 
have the character as Kuhn ascribes to it that it 
is capable of giving rise to extraordinary or 
revolutionary science. 
Later by taking into account the Kuhn' s 
comparative evaluations of Normal and extraordinary 
science on the supposition that history of science 
does in fact display a Normal science-Extraordinary 
science cycle, Watkin challenged this supposition 
in different form. His objection was concerned with 
the possibility of the emergence of a new paradigm 
at the end of a period of Normal science and 
concluded that the new paradigm never could emerge 
from Normal science as characterized by Kuhn. 
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For this Watkin recapitulated Kuhnian 
thesis concerning paradigm change which ultimately 
leads to meaning change in scientific theories. 
1. It is the nature of a paradigm to enjoy a 
monopoly in its hold on a scientist's thinking. A 
scientist cannot entertain a rival paradigm while 
under the sway of one paradigm. If he has started 
toying with a rival paradigm, then the old 
paradigm is already defunct for him. This he 
called paradigm-monopoly thesis. 
2. There is little or no interregnum between the end 
of the old paradigm's rern over a scientist's 
mind, and the beginning of the new paradigm' s 
rein. A scientist does not flounder around for 
any substantial length of time with no paradigm 
to guide him. He abandons one paradigm only to 
embrace a new one. Watkin calls this non-
interregnum thesis. 
3. A new paradigm will be incompatible with the 
paradigm it supercedes and further Kuhn claims 
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that it will be incommensurable with the old 
one. ^  Watkin calls this thesis as a clash between 
the old and new paradigm. 
4. From the conjunction of the above three theses, 
it follows that a scientist's change over from an 
old paradigm to a new; one must be swift and 
decisive. Kuhn emphatically endorses this 
application. He says that paradigm switch is a 
relatively sudden and unstructured event like the 
gestalt switch.^ So Watkin calls this as Gestalt 
switch thesis. 
5. Kuhn's view allows that it may take quite a time 
for a paradigm, once invented to gain general 
acceptance. But, how long may it take the 
original inventor to put together the rudiments 
of the new paradigm. He says that we must 
remember that the new paradigm is immediately 
powerful enough to induce our scientist to turn 
against the well articulated and unrefuted that 
has dominated his scientific thinking. This means 
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that new paradigm at the outset must be large and 
definite enough for its striking potentials to be 
fairly apparent to its inventor. If that is so, 
the instant-paradigm thesis according to Watkin 
seems to be barely credible on psychological 
grounds. He also says that there seems to be a 
certain internal incoherence in Kuhn's version of 
•5 
his thesis and here Watkin calls that the 
paradigm monopoly thesis must go. 
REFERENCES 
1. Kuhn T.S., "The structure of scientific 
revolution" Univ. of Chicago press, 
Chicago. PP: 91,102, 111,147 (1962) 
2. Ibid. P: 121. 
129 
3. Watkin J "Against Normal Science" in I Lakatos and A 
Musgrave (Eds.), Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970, p:37 
129' 
Chapfer-4 
Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
Science is not united by its subject matter but 
rather by its methodology. What sets the scientific 
approach apart from other modes of acquiring 
knowledge are the assumptions, upon which it is 
based and its methodology. Thus the scientific 
methodology is a system of explicit rules and 
procedures upon which research is based and against 
which claims for knowledge are evaluated. This 
system is neither closed nor infalliable. Rather 
the rules and procedures are constantly improved; 
scientists look for new methods and techniques of 
observations, inference, generalization and 
analysis. Thus it follows that method of science is 
more stable and more important to the philosopher 
of science. The method makes possible the noting 
and correction of errors by continued application 
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of itself and enhances the internal consistency of 
claims for empirical knowledge. 
Since, the central problem in 20^ *^  century 
philosophy of science has been the nature of 
meaning in scientific theories. For this purpose, I 
have organized my work in such a way so as to 
examine the adherents of this view, particularly 
Kuhn and its aftermath effect. 
The chapter two entails in detail the Kuhn's 
notion of meaning variance, which emerged as a 
major alternative to logical positivism. Within the 
framework erected by logical positivism, change, 
comparison of meaning, presented no problem rather 
the terms used in a theory whose meaning can be 
given independently of the theory.- remains constant 
across the theory. In contrast to positivist's 
position Kuhn maintains that meaning of a term that 
occurs in a scientific theory changes when theory 
is modified or replaced by another theory. Thus by 
realizing the ultimate inadequacy or irrelevance of 
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logical positivism in understanding the growth of 
science, Kuhn sets about the task of giving an 
explanation of the way in which it comes about. It 
is clear in his program that historical evidences 
lie in the background for the articulation of the 
framework, which he employed. 
Another significant feature is that in contrast to 
normal science, Kuhn views revolutionary science as 
the abrupt development of a rival paradigm that can 
be accepted only gradually by a scientific 
community. It is then, established that, degree of 
meaning variance rests upon paradigm shift. Further 
the work of Kuhn has led to extensive discussion on 
the problems of theory change and it is important 
to be clear that there are two distinct problems 
involved; the analysis of the grounds for deciding 
to abandon one theory and replace it with another 
and the clarification after the fact of the 
relation between the two successive theories. 
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In the next chapter (chapter 3) the views of the 
few eminent post-Kuhnian (Imre Lakatos, Larry 
Laudan, C.R.Kordig, Mark.A. Stone, John Watkin) 
thinkers have been discussed. How far have they 
established their position in contrast to Kuhnian 
notion? 
Imre Lakatos does not fully agree with Kuhn's 
notion of scientific progress through paradigm 
shift. According to him the rationale of scientific 
revolution lies in the progressive research 
program. He says that science is not simply the 
achievements of hypothesis, a series of conjectures 
and refutations but rather a research program. He 
has discussed the problems of objective appraisal 
of scientific growth in terms of progressive and 
degenerating problem shift in series of scientific 
theories. For example Debroglie's paper came at the 
time when Bohr's program was degenerating. 
Lakatos was of the view that one must stay with a 
research program until it has exhausted all its 
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heuristic power, that one must not introduce a 
rival program before everybody agrees that the 
point of degeneration has probably been reached. 
According to him the history of science has been 
and should be a history of competing research 
program. When two research programmes compete, 
their first ideal models usually deal with 
different aspects of the domain. (For example, the 
first model of Newton's semi corpuscular optics 
described light refraction and the first model of 
Huyghen's wave optics described light 
interference). As the rival research program 
expands they gradually encroach on each other's 
territory and the version of the first (research 
program) will be inconsistent with the version of 
the second. 
After Lakatos, the next eminent post-Kuhnian 
thinker to whom I have incorporated in chapter 
three is Larry Laudan. We can now observe his 
implication of model of scientific change in 
134 
contrast to Kuhn and Lakatos. Laudan says that 
Lakatos' research program like Kuhn's paradigm is 
rigid in their hard core structure. So he turned to 
explore an alternative model of scientific progress 
that is "research tradition" which provides a 
guideline for the development of scientific theory. 
Laudan finds that both Kuhn and Lakatos are 
committed to the views that there is two radically 
different types of science. For Lakatos it is 
immature and mature science; for Kuhn, it is "pre" 
and post-paradigm science. For Kuhn transition 
occurs when one paradigm establishes monopoly over 
the field and when normal science ensues. For 
Lakatos, a science reaches maturity when a 
scientist focuses entirely on the mathematical 
articulation of research programs. Thus for both 
Kuhn and Lakatos, it is emergence of paradigm or 
research program. 
Laudan had established that he hardly 
finds any characterization of mature science in 
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both (Kuhn and Lakatos) which will do justice both 
to history and rationality. So rather he is 
suggesting that a scientific revolution occur when 
a research tradition reaches a point of development 
where scientists in the field feel obliged to 
consider it seriously as a contender for the 
allegiance of themselves or their colleagues. 
The next eminent thinker who has been 
taken into account in this chapter is C.R.Kordig. 
He holds his position in opposition to widely 
influential views of Kuhn, which maintains that 
shifts of one paradigm to another force a change in 
the meaning of terms employed, which precludes the 
possibility of comparison of different scientific 
theories. Kordig holds that during a revolution 
when a scientist embraces such a new paradigm, he 
does not interpret. Rather, according to Kuhn, he 
experiences a Gestalt shift, which is a sudden and 
unstructured interpretation. Kordig further argues 
in favor of justification of scientific change. 
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which rests upon different sorts of invariance. He 
also sketches an account of comparison for 
different scientific theories to avoid the 
shortcomings of meaning variance theorists like 
Kuhn. 
The another post Kuhnian philosopher 
included here is Mark A. Stone. He argues that Kuhn 
is mistaken in his claim that scientist never 
rejects a paradigm without simultaneously 
accepting a new paradigm. Mark stone on the other 
hand says that science rejects a paradigm despite 
the absence of a successor. Thus Kuhn was subjected 
to criticism with respect to his historical example 
of Copernican revolution. Second thing, which was 
raised by Mark Stone against Kuhn is about the 
types of scientific discoveries. He differentiated 
scientific discovery into three types: spontaneous; 
implicit & directed and finally says that Kuhn 
thesis holds for spontaneous and implicit discovery 
but not directed discoveries. Thus he established 
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that in the former two sorts of discoveries, 
results are happened by chance but in accordance 
with the last one that is directed discovery result 
is preceded by rational procedure. 
John Watkin also discussed the problem of 
meaning variance in the form of paradigm-shift 
(Kuhn) . He objected the possibility of the 
emergence of a new paradigm as characterized by 
Kuhn and says that his paradigm monopoly thesis 
should go. 
Thus there is no lack of suggestion for 
the criteria used by scientist in making their 
choice which further establishes that the history 
of science is a tale of multifarious shifting of 
allegiance from theory to theory. 
Among the philosophers who have been 
discussed, I find Kuhn's approach of ''paradigm 
shift", a dependent criteria for meaning variance 
is more successful, more appealing, undefeatable 
and highly conclusive. 
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